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Review
Islamism and Islam
Bassam Tibi. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012.
242pp.

Dale Stover*
This book offers a concerted effort to provide a comprehensive and unmistakable
definition for Islamism, whereas the other term in the title, Islam, is simply what is
traditional or classical or taken for granted since little attention is given to defining it.
The author lays out six features he considers to be characteristic elements of those
contemporary Muslim movements associated with extremist beliefs and behaviors. A
separate chapter is devoted to each of these six features of Islamism. They are described
by the author in the preface as “its deeply reactionary vision of the world political order,
its embrace of genocidal antisemitism, its predicament with democracy, its use of
violence, the shari’atization of law, and its search for authenticity within an Islamic
tradition it has largely reinvented out of an obsessive desire for purity” (xiii). However,
as the author lays out his case for the six descriptors of what he labels “Islamism,” it
becomes evident that all of the six features have definitional boundaries that are
problematic.
One aspect of the tension in the author’s definition of Islamism derives from his
claiming on the one hand that “political, economic, and social concerns are articulated in
terms of religious claims, thus heralding what I (Bassam Tibi) have termed the
religionization of politics,” while on the other hand, he insists that “Islamism is based on
*
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a real religious faith and a genuine conception of the divine.

Thus the religious

pronouncements of Islamists, . . . do not reflect a purely instrumental use of religion”
(35).

While trying to demonstrate that Islamism and Islam refer to quite different

realities, the author nevertheless confesses that “Islamists view themselves as true
believers—and thus, in the most important sense, they are” (35).
The author attempts to explain Islamism as a totalitarian response to a particular
crisis. “In the case of Islamism, the crisis arose from a failure of development in relation
to the much more powerful West, a failure of both modernism and liberalism to strike
roots in the Islamic world” (36). This extraordinarily weak explanation betrays the
Orientalism of the author. How does he expect “modernism and liberalism to strike roots
in the Islamic world” when Western powers have been maintaining a brutal colonial
hegemony over that Islamic world?

It would seem the author sorely lacks an

understanding of the process of decolonization which may require more than one
generation of cultural rehabilitation to repair the damages wreaked upon a colonized
people. I speak of the author’s Orientalism precisely because he rejects Edward Said’s
use of the term to make evident the cultural arrogance of European scholars in assuming
the intellectual and cultural superiority of Western discourse as they diagnosed and
advised concerning what was best for colonized peoples. Though the author describes
himself as a “devout Muslim,” he also makes clear that his intellectual mentors and
system of values is indelibly European, and he demonstrates little empathy for the real
circumstances of colonized peoples as he describes Islamism as having a “deeply
reactionary vision of the world political order.”
Our author frets the Islamist rejection of democracy as the path to genuine
governance which he equates with the practice of contemporary European states. He
warns that some Islamist groups may endorse democratic voting as a means to achieve
political control, but this will not lead to the pluralism permitted in a modern European
secular state. He cites multiple times the critical role of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
in establishing a separation of political governance from religious hegemony, resulting in
a political system of state sovereignty, a secular social order, and religious pluralism, a
combination which he views as a universal good. The author does not address the case of
the State of Israel which has what appears to be a democratic form of government, but
was established as an explicitly Jewish state that by law privileges Jews over non-Jews in
a variety of ways. Could he say that Israel has a genuinely secular social order and
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genuine religious pluralism? State sovereignty in the author’s Westphalian model is an
idealized or essentialized notion on the part of the author that may not correspond to the
practice of actual states, as for example in the era of European imperial expansion and
colonization, or as with the various state alliances formed in WWI, WWII, and in the
Cold War era. Still, the author is right to note that Islamists do reject this model, though
he has trouble empathizing with their reasons.
The author notes that Islamists view democracy, secularism, and religious
pluralism as cultural imports by the colonizing Western powers, which taints them as
practices of the oppressor. Choosing to reject them and to reclaim their cultural and
religious “purity,” is described by the author as “inventing traditions” which turn out to
be totalitarian and revolutionary social and political forms. One could suppose that
Islamists are in this way imitating the colonial powers, having internalized the ethics of
the colonizers. Our author does not suggest this, since he only sees European cultural
and political forms as admirable and having universally beneficial effects.
What the author does do is look at Islamic traditional history and note that what
he terms “an Islamic ‘Enlightenment’’’ was at one time present, and that “the classical
heritage of Islam contained the seeds of an Enlightenment that resembles European
cultural modernity” (185).

Alas, he notes that “the seeds of this rationalism were

suppressed by the fiqh orthodoxy,” but “deserve to be revived” (185). He is excited by
this notion and suggests it as a far more excellent route for Islamists to take, although he
admits that “it runs counter to any purification” (186).
The author acknowledges a split in Islamic tradition between the philosophers
and the jurists, between “falsafa (rationalism) as opposed to the fiqh (orthodoxy)” (111).
He considers himself to be an Averroist, identifying with the falsafa rather than fiqh,
which is the scholarly effort to interpret Islamic law, shari’a, in accordance with the
Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.

It is shari’a which claims the

attention of the Islamists as they strive to reclaim their cultural and religious identity and
shuck off the imports of the West. Islamists cannot fathom how the author can claim to
be a “devout Muslim” while also admiring the European cultural and political world,
whose Enlightenment he sees as a breakthrough for human reason tapping into universal
meanings. Are the Europeans so admirable in their Enlightenment if it leads them to
become brutalizing colonizers of other peoples?
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That brings us to what the author calls the shari’atization of law by Islamism,
which means to the matter of fiqh. The reader already knows that the author is an
admirer of Western constitutional law and that he is indifferent about the traditional
Islamic focus on fiqh, the scholarly effort to ascertain legal rulings on the basis of the
Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, which rulings constitute shari’a. Within Sunni
Islam there developed four schools (madhahib) of fiqh or legal interpretation, and each of
the four were considered authoritative in relation to particular geographic regions of
Sunni Islam. There were, however, clear differences in specific legal interpretations
among these four schools, and there has never been an integrated system of shari’a
embracing all of the four schools. Colonialism introduced Western legal traditions into
colonial governance and shari’a became limited to matters of ritual and family law. In its
ambition to throw off the oppressive weight of colonialism, Islamism aims to replace all
Western law with a re-instatement of shari’a. Since shari’a never functioned in the way
Islamism now envisions it to function, the author notes that this is solved by “inventing”
a shari’a to accomplish their goal, claiming shari’a as the law of God which is not
contestable since it represents divine rule over this world. The author rightly notes that
this shari’atization of law becomes totalitarian—it is no longer a product of traditional
fiqh, but of inventive assertion by political actors.
What the author does not consider is how Islamist thinking arrives at this choice
of shari’atization and whether it is truly totalitarian in each instance. For example, the
author targets Sayyid Qutb, calling him “the rector spiritus of Islamism” (xi). The author
justly tracks all of the key characteristics of Islamism to Qutb. Yet, Qutb’s biographer,
John Calvert, claims that Qutb’s influential book, Social Justice in Islam, was influenced
by the example of Muhammad ‘Abduh, the liberal reformist Grand Mufti of Egypt, who
sought to accommodate Islam “to the requirements of global modernity” (Calvert 2010:
137).

“Like the reformers,” Calvert claims, “Qutb interpreted Islam as a rational,

practical and scientifically sound religion that was in accord with human nature. Thus, he
adopted from the usul al-fiqh the juridical concept of the general interest of the
community (al-maslaha al-‘amma) and like ‘Abduh, he applied it in a way that called to
mind the utilitarian thinking fashionable in Europe” (ibid., 137–38).
Nevertheless, Calvert notes, at a later point, Qutb “reacted to the reversal of
Muslim fortunes in a way that bred a sense of distance from the West rather than
accommodation with the foundations of its civilization. In Qutb’s view, . . . far from
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being a benevolent mentor to Muslim peoples, the West and its domestic agents were
adversaries intent on political and cultural conquest of the Islamic world” (ibid., 138).
This provides a more nuanced understanding than that offered by the author of how Qutb,
having experienced persecution, imprisonment, and impending execution by the Nasser
government, arrived at the endorsement of shari’atization for Islamism.
For most of Islamic history, both Jews and Christians were considered “Peoples
of the Book” who were given protected status, despite treasonous behavior on the part of
Jewish tribes belonging to the community of Medina which had pledged loyalty to the
civil leadership of Muhammad in 622 A.D. The author charges Islamism with inventing
a history that portrays Jews as the perennial enemies of Muslims ever since 622 A.D.
Sayyid Qutb is cited as describing the conflict between Muslims and Jews in terms of “a
cosmic war,” though it is largely fought, Qutb says, as “a war of ideas” (64). Moreover,
Islamists maintain that Jews and Christians are collaborators in the war against Islam.
According to Qutb, “the Jews were the instigator from the very first moment. The
Crusaders (Christians) followed next” (66). The author holds that Islamists construe their
antisemitism to coincide with anti-Westernism, so that Islamists believe that Jews also
“rule the United States indirectly from their strongholds on New York’s Wall Street”
(67).
That antisemitism has infected Islamists like a dreadful virus cannot be disputed,
and the author laments this development while criticizing the poor treatment shown
Muslim immigrants in Europe. What he does not do is to recognize the historical facts of
favors done for Jews by the Western nations at the expense of Muslims. The Balfour
Declaration became one of these facts on 31 October 1917, when the British Cabinet
announced that “His Majesty’s Government views with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People.” Sir Herbert Samuel, Postmaster
General, who was a member of that cabinet, was the first Jewish person to sit in a British
cabinet. In January 1915, he sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister proposing that
Palestine should become a British protectorate because it was of strategic importance to
the British Empire and urging a large-scale Jewish settlement there. By October 1917,
David Lloyd George had become the Prime Minister and he authorized Foreign Secretary
Arthur Balfour to issue the Balfour Declaration. This was done without consultation with
the largely Muslim residents of Palestine. What mattered to the British was their Empire
and the Balfour Declaration advanced the interests of that Empire.
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After WWII, the British wanted out of Palestine and they asked the United
Nations to resolve the future of Palestine. The UN supported a partition of Palestine
between a Jewish state and an Arab state. In a pre-emptive move, the new State of Israel
was proclaimed by a Provisional Government on 14 May 1948, and on that same day
President Harry Truman of the United States, presumably viewing the new state as an
ally in the developing Cold War with the USSR, officially recognized the new Jewish
state and its government. It would have been helpful for the author to make some
reckoning of how lslamist antisemitism is related to Western intervention in bringing
about a Jewish state in formerly Arab territory. Otherwise, he leaves us to assume that
Islamism is simply irrational as well as immoral in promoting antisemitism.
The author addresses the Islamist use of violence as he tracks how classical
jihad is transformed by Islamism into “modern jihadism.” Traditionally, jihad meant
moral effort in following a true spiritual path. In some circumstances this could involve
physical conflict in acts of self-defense.

The author states that “long before Carl

Clausewitz formulated his theory of war, Muslims abided by rules and a code of conduct
that limited targets in line with humanitarian standards” (135). Surprisingly, the author
argues that “violence is not inherent in Islamism, since the core concern is the order of
the state and of the world” (135). Yet, he also claims that “jihadist violence is a variety
of terrorism and therefore not consistent with the ethics of classical jihad” (156). The
author laments that the West does not properly understand jihadist violence, since it
should not be seen as merely acts of desperation or simply a version of irregular warfare,
but is oriented around the goal of “de-Westernization of the world” and “international
destabilization” (147–48). The major target of jihadism, the author claims, is “the order
of the secular nation-state” (156). Put most succinctly by the author, “jihadism is a
divine war, a ‘global jihad,’ in which violence is only an element” (142).
While the author provides the reader with useful insights regarding Islamist
jihadism, he stops short of suggesting that Western colonization practices and the cultural
and religious disparagement of Islamic peoples by certain forms of Orientalist discourse
can represent another sort of violence which radically disordered the world of those
colonized. In the midst of his discussion of Islamist violence, the author mentions an
attempt by Pope Benedict in a lecture at Regensburg University on 12 September 2006 to
raise the matter of violence as a problematic issue between Islam and the Christian West.
The pope quoted the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus as saying “show me just
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what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and
inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached” (137). Our
author notes that “this is undeniably a clumsy way to raise any issue with the followers of
the Prophet, especially when one represents the church that brought us the Crusades and
the Inquisition. Still the underlying message was entirely reasonable: the pope wished to
engage the Islamic world in a discussion of whether it is ever legitimate to use violence to
spread faith. . . . The response, largely orchestrated by Islamists, was worldwide Muslim
outrage” (137–38).

The author goes on in the following paragraph to deplore that

Muslims were unable to engage “in an honest dialogue” and he claims to “have no doubt
that the pope’s intentions were benign” (138).
The author appears completely unaware that an Open Letter to His Holiness
Pope Benedict XVI appeared in Islamica Magazine on 12 October 2006, signed by 38
Muslim notables, including nine grand muftis and one ayatollah. The Open Letter states,
“while we applaud your efforts to oppose the dominance of positivism and materialism in
human life, we must point out some errors in the way you mentioned Islam as a
counterpoint to the proper use of reason, as well as some mistakes in the assertions you
put forward in support of your argument.” This Open Letter which continued on for
approximately three typescript pages, was in no way “clumsy.” It was a model of
classical Islamic scholarship while also displaying all the sophistication of modern
Western learning and scholarly courtesy—no hint of Islamism at any point. How is it
that Bassam Tibi remained unaware of this Open Letter at the time of his book’s
publication six years later? Had he become so focused on Islamism that he lost touch
with Islam?
Such an impressively scripted Open Letter with so many signatures, appearing
within exactly one month of the Pope’s lecture, could scarcely be imagined without the
existence of a network of Muslim scholars and religious and political authorities drawn
together in 2005 and 2006 by the project known as the Amman Message, so called
because it was initiated in Jordan by that country’s king and religious scholars. At an
international conference in Amman in July of 2005, 200 Islamic scholars from 50
countries convened and issued a ruling on three points with the effect of fundamentally
undercutting Islamist practices.

The “Three Points” of the Amman Message were

subsequently endorsed by six other international assemblies of Islamic scholars so that
over 500 leading Muslim scholars and religious authorities were in agreement. The
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“Three Points” defined who is to be considered authentically Muslim, forbade the
practice of takfir (naming someone an unbeliever) between Muslims, and established the
subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of legitimate fatwas (shari’a
rulings).
While the Three Points of the Amman Message do not as such put an end to
what our author labels as Islamism, they do represent a significant step by traditional
Islam to mark out definitional boundaries making clear that Islam is not Islamism. The
author deserves the readers’ thanks for his effort to bring to a fuller viewing those
contemporary Islamist practices and understandings that do not conform to Islamic
tradition and may merit a distinctive branding such as Islamism. Readers should also be
advised to retain some misgivings about how sound one’s own perception of this socalled Islamism can be for those of us whose intellectual formation lies within the orbit of
the colonizers. Bassam Tibi, in taking up this task as a Muslim, has put himself at risk of
jihadi retribution, and we must admire his courage.
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